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A firewall system is a packet filter that is placed at the entry point
of an enterprise network in the Internet. Packets that attempt to enter the
enterprise network through this entry point are examined, one by one, against
the rules of some underlying firewall F of the firewall system. Each rule in F
has a decision which is either “accept” or “reject”. For any incoming packet p,
the firewall system identifies the first rule (in the sequence of rules in F ) that
matches p. If the decision of this rule is “accept”, then the firewall system
forwards p to the enterprise network. Otherwise the decision of this rule is
“reject” and packet p is discarded and prevented from entering the network.
Each firewall system consists of two units: a rule matching unit and
a decision unit. Both units are usually executed in the firewall system. To
simplify the task of managing the firewall system, we identify a special class of
firewall systems, called the outsourced system, where the rule matching unit is
executed in a public cloud. Unfortunately, public clouds are usually unreliable
ix
and execution of the rule matching unit in a public cloud can be vulnerable
to two types of attacks: verifiability attacks and privacy attacks.
The main objective of this dissertation is to discuss how to execute
the rule matching unit of an outsourced system in a public cloud such that
verifiability and privacy attacks are prevented from occurring. The main con-
tribution of this dissertation is three-fold.
First, we discuss how to design outsourced firewall system such that
execution of the designed system in the public clouds prevents the occurrence
of verifiability and privacy attacks. The resulting system, called the private
system, make use of two public clouds. We show that this private system
prevents verifiability and privacy attacks under the assumption that the two
public clouds used in this system are both “sensible” and “non-colluding”.
Second, we identify a special class of firewalls, called the partially spec-
ified firewall, where a firewall is called partially specified when the decisions of
some of the rules in the firewall are not specified as “accept” or “reject”. We
show that for every partially specified firewall PF , there is a (fully specified)
firewall F such that PF and F are equivalent. We discuss how to design an
outsourced system whose underlying firewall is a partially specified firewall PF
such that the designed system prevents both verifiability and privacy attacks.
We achieve this outsourced system by obtaining an equivalent firewall F from
PF and designing a private system for F .
Third, we present a generalization of firewalls called firewall expres-
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sions. A firewall expression is specified using one or more component firewalls
and three firewall operators: “not”, “and”, and “or”. For example, the firewall
expression (G and H) consists of two component firewalls G and H and one
firewall operator “and”. This firewall expression accepts a packet p iff both
firewalls G and H accept p. For any underlying firewall expression FE, we de-
fine an Expression System as a generalization of firewall systems that takes as
input any packet p and determines whether the underlying firewall expression
FE accepts or rejects packet p.
We design an outsourced expression system for any underlying firewall
expression FE. We achieve this outsourced expression system by using a
private system for each component firewall of FE and combining these private
systems through an overall decision unit to determine whether any packet is
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A firewall system is a packet filter that is placed at the entry point of
an enterprise network in the Internet. The function of the firewall system is
to examine the packets that attempt to enter the enterprise network through
the entry point, identify malicious packets, and prevent the malicious packets
from entering the network. Thus, a firewall system is a critical component in
the security of an enterprise network.
Each firewall system is built on top of an underlying firewall F . A
firewall F is a sequence of rules where each rule consists of a sequence number,
a predicate, and a decision. The sequence number of each rule is a unique
integer in the range from 1 to n, where n is the number of rules in F . The
predicate of each rule is defined using t attributes u1, u2, . . . , and ut. The
decision of each rule is either “accept” or “reject”.
Packets that attempt to enter the enterprise network through the entry
point are examined, one by one, against the rules of the underlying firewall
F of the firewall system. Examining a packet against the rules of the under-
lying firewall F , the firewall system determines whether to allow the packet
to be accepted and forwarded to the enterprise network or to be rejected and
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prevented from entering the network. A packet p is accepted (or rejected, re-
spectively) by the underlying firewall F iff the decision of the first rule in F
that matches p is accept (or reject, respectively).
In this dissertation, we study the execution of firewall systems using
public clouds. Executing firewall system using public clouds can simplify the
task of managing the firewall system for an enterprise network. Each fire-
wall system consists of two units: a rule matching unit and a decision unit.
Typically, both the rule matching unit and the decision unit of the firewall
system are executed by the system itself. In this dissertation, we are inter-
ested to investigate a class of firewall systems, called outsoured firewall sys-
tems, whose rule matching units are executed by public clouds. Unfortunately,
public clouds can be unreliable causing outsourced systems to be vulnerable
against two types of attacks: verifiability attacks and privacy attacks. In this
dissertation, we explore different designs of outsourced firewall systems with
an objective that the designed system takes advantage of public clouds and at
the same time prevents the verifiability and privacy attacks from occurring.
1.1 Firewall Systems
For any firewall F , we can define a Firewall System that takes as input
any packet p and determines whether packet p is accepted or rejected according
to the rules in F . In this case, we call firewall F the underlying firewall of the
firewall system. The architecture of a firewall system is presented in Figure 1.1.
This system consists of two units: a rule matching unit and a decision unit.
2
Both the rule matching unit and the decision unit are built on top of the




(p, #(F, p)) 
accept p  or 
reject p
Figure 1.1: The architecture of a firewall system
When a packet p attempts to pass this firewall system, p is first di-
rected to the rule matching unit. The task of the rule matching unit is to
determine the sequence number of the first rule in F that matches p and send
this sequence number to the decision unit. In Figure 1.1, the notation #(F, p)
denote the sequence number of the first match rule in firewall F for packet p.
The task of the decision unit is to determine the decision of the rule whose
sequence number is #(F, p).
If the first match rule in F for p has a decision “accept”, then the
decision unit forwards p to the enterprise network. Otherwise, the first match
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rule in F for p has a decision “reject”, and in this case the decision unit discards
packet p and prevents it from entering the firewall system.
1.2 Firewall Outsourcing
Traditionally a firewall systems is designed and implemented such that
all the tasks of the firewall system are executed by the system itself. A com-
paratively newer approach is to design and implement a firewall system such
that some tasks of the firewall system are implemented and executed in public
clouds. The approach of implementing and executing part of a firewall system
in public clouds is called firewall outsourcing. Such a firewall system is called
an outsourced firewall system.
In recent years, with the rise of cloud computing, enterprises have be-
come interested in implementing and managing their firewall systems by us-
ing public clouds to reduce the associated cost and management complexity
[37, 58], and [69]. According to a survey of firewall systems, firewall outsourc-
ing can provide three benefits [61]. First, reduces the initial investment and
the operational cost of the firewall system by taking advantage of the pay-per-
use model of the cloud. Second, reduces the number or staff needed to manage
and implement the firewall system. Third, increases availability of the firewall
system by maintaining necessary back-ups.
Despite these benefits of firewall outsoutcing, an outsourced system can
become vulnerable to security attacks caused by the fact that public clouds
are usually unreliable.
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In this dissertation, we identify a class of outsourced systems whose
rule matching units are executed in public clouds. We obtain this outsourced
system from the firewall system presented in Figure 1.1 by executing the rule
matching unit in a public cloud C. Since cloud C is unreliable, the outsourced
system is vulnerable to two types of security attacks: verifiability attacks and
privacy attacks.
The verifiability attacks, caused by cloud C can be described as follows.
When cloud C executes the rule matching unit of the outsourced system and
computes the sequence number of the first match rule in the underlying firewall
F for an incoming packet p, C may compute a wrong value. In particular, C
may compute a sequence number v of a match rule (not the first match rule)
in F for p and send the wrongly computed sequence number v to the decision
unit. In this case, the decision unit will accept or reject packet p according
to the decision of the rule whose sequence number is v in F . As a result, the
decision unit may end up incorrectly accepting a packet instead of rejecting it
or may end up incorrectly rejecting a packet instead of accepting it.
The privacy attacks, caused by cloud C can be described as follows.
If C knows the rules of the underlying firewall F , C may leak F to potential
attackers of the system.
Our goal in this dissertation is to design outsourced firewall systems by
taking advantage of public clouds, such that verifiability and privacy attacks
are prevented from occurring.
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1.3 Limitation of Prior Outsourced Systems
Several outsourced firewall systems, for example, the systems in [20, 37,
42, 43, 60, 62, 68, 75], and [49], have been presented in the literature that take
advantage of one or more public clouds.
An important limitation of all prior outsourced systems is that none
of the systems defends against both verifiability and privacy attacks. We can
divide the prior outsourced systems into three categories as follows.
1. Systems that defend only against verifiability attacks.
2. Systems that defend only against privacy attacks.
3. Systems that do not defend against verifiability and privacy attacks.
In the firewall systems presented in [20, 75], and [76], the rules of the
underlying firewall F are stored in the clear in the cloud. Each incoming
packet to the enterprise network is directed in the clear to the cloud. For
each incoming packet p, the cloud determines whether to accept or reject p
according to the rules of the underlying firewall F which are stored in the cloud.
If the cloud determines to accept p, then the cloud forwards p to the entry
point of the enterprise network. Then the firewall systems in [20, 75], and [76]
verify that packet p is indeed accepted according the underlying firewall F .
Therefore, these firewall systems defend against verifiability attacks.
Whereas the firewall systems in [75] and [76] execute the verification
steps online, the firewall system in [20] executes the verification steps offline.
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Moreover, because the rules of the underlying firewall F are stored in the clear
in the cloud, the cloud can leak these rules to potential attackers of the system.
Therefore, the firewall systems in [20, 75], and [76] defends against verifiability
attacks but do not defend against privacy attacks.
In the firewall systems presented in [37, 42, 43, 60, 62, 68], and [49], the
rules of the underlying firewall F are encrypted before they are stored in the
cloud. Each incoming packet to the enterprise network is directed to the cloud.
For each incoming packet p, the cloud determines whether to accept or reject p
according to the encrypted rules of the underlying firewall F which are stored
in the cloud. If the cloud determines to accept p, then the cloud forwards p to
the entry point of the enterprise network. Because the rules of the underlying
firewall F which are stored in the cloud are encrypted, the cloud cannot know
the rules of the underlying firewall F and so cannot leak these rules to potential
attackers of the system.
However, none of these firewall systems verifies that packet p that has
been forwarded to the entry point of the enterprise network from the cloud is
indeed accepted according to the underlying firewall F . Therefore the firewall
systems in [37, 42, 43, 60, 62], and [68] defend against privacy attacks but do
not defend against verifiability attacks.
The outsourced systems in [25] and [61] are designed assuming that
public clouds are reliable. Thus, in these systems the rules of the underlying
firewall F are stored in the clear in the cloud. Each incoming packet to the
enterprise network is directed in the clear to the cloud. For each incoming
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packet p, the cloud determines whether to accept or reject p according to the
rules of the underlying firewall F which are stored in the cloud. These firewall
systems do not verify that packet p is indeed accepted or rejected according
the underlying firewall F . Moreover, because the rules of the underlying fire-
wall F are stored in the clear in the cloud, the cloud can leak these rules
to potential attackers of the system. Therefore, these systems do not defend
against verifiability and privacy attacks.
1.4 Our Contributions
In this dissertation, we present different designs of outsourced systems
such that the designed system takes advantage of public clouds but prevents
the occurrence of verifiability and privacy attacks. There are three main con-
tributions in this dissertation.
The first contribution in this dissertation is to discuss how to design an
outsourced firewall system whose rule matching units are executed in public
clouds such that verifiability and privacy attacks cannot occur. The resulting
outsourced system, called the private system, makes use of two public clouds
in order to execute the rule matching units. We show that this private system
prevents verifiability and privacy attacks under the assumption that the two
public clouds used in this system are both “sensible” and “non-colluding”.
Our second contribution is to design an outsourced system for a special
class of firewalls, called the partially specified firewall. A firewall is called par-
tially specified when the decisions of some of the rules in the firewall are not
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specified as “accept” or “reject”. We show that for every partially specified
firewall PF , there is a (fully specified) firewall F such that PF and F are
equivalent. We discuss how to design an outsourced system whose underly-
ing firewall is a partially specified firewall PF such that the designed system
prevents both verifiability and privacy attacks. We achieve this outsourced
system by obtaining an equivalent firewall F from PF and designing a private
system for F .
In this dissertation, our third contribution is to present a generaliza-
tion of firewalls into firewall expressions and design and outsourced systems
for firewall expressions. A firewall expression is specified using one or more
component firewalls and the three firewall operators: “not”, “and”, and “or”.
For example, a firewall expression ((G and H) or not(G)) consists of two com-
ponent firewalls G and H and the three firewall operators “and”, “or”, and
“not”. This firewall expression accepts a packet p iff both firewalls G and H
accept p or firewall G rejects p.
For any underlying firewall expression, we define an Expression System
as a generalization of firewall systems that takes as input any packet p and de-
termines whether the underlying firewall expression accepts packet p or rejects
p.
We design an outsourced expression system for any underlying firewall
expression FE. We achieve this outsourced expression system by using a
private system for each component firewall of FE and combining these private
systems through an overall decision unit to determine whether any packet p is
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accepted or rejected according to the firewall expression FE.
1.5 Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, we present basic concepts related to firewalls and per-
form a literature review on firewalls. We divide the literature on firewalls
into five categories: firewall design, firewall analysis, property verification of
firewalls, packet classification and firewall outsourcing. A brief survey of the
research that have been conducted in the first four categories are presented in
Section 2.3. We review the research works that fall in the category of firewall
outsourcing in Section 2.4.
In Chapter 3, we show how to design an outsourced system whose rule
matching unit is executed in a public cloud such that the resulting system pre-
vents verifiability and privacy attacks. We discuss execution of an outsourced
system in Section 3.2 and formally specify verifiability and privacy attacks in
Section 3.3. We design an outsourced system, called the verifiable system that
prevents verifiability attacks in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, we modify the ver-
ifiable system to a system, called the private system that prevents occurrence
of both attacks.
Chapter 4 presents a special class of firewalls, called partially specified
firewalls. This chapter proceeds by first presenting several definitions such as
definition of partially specified firewalls, definition of a packet being accepted
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or rejected by a partially specified firewall and so on. Then, we show that every
partially specified firewall is equivalent to a (fully specified) firewall. Finally,
we show how to design an outsourced system when the underlying firewall is
partially specified.
In Chapter 5, we introduce a generalization of firewalls, called firewall
expressions. In Section 5.2, we present formal definition of firewall expres-
sions and discuss three theorems that state fundamental properties of firewall
expressions. In Section 5.3, we discuss an algorithm that can be used to eval-
uate a given firewall expression for any input stream of packets. Sections 5.4
and 5.5 present the logical analysis to determine whether the given firewall
expressions satisfy some logical properties such as adequacy, implication, and
equivalence.
Chapter 6 presents a generalization of firewall systems, called the ex-
pression systems that accepts or rejects incoming packets based on an underly-
ing firewall expression. The architecture of an expression system in presented
in Section 6.2. We design an outsourced expression system using public clouds
in Section 6.3. We describe the execution of our designed outsourced expres-
sion system in Section 6.4. We discuss in Section 6.5 that verifiability and
privacy attacks cannot occur in the designed outsourced expression system.
We conclude this dissertation in Chapter 7. In this chapter, we identify
some open research problems related to firewall outsourcing and shed some
light on how to approach some of these open problems by taking advantage of




The function of the firewall system of an enterprise network is to iden-
tify malicious packets that aim to attack the enterprise network and prevent
these packets from entering the network. Packets that attempt to enter the
enterprise network through the entry point are examined, one by one, by the
firewall system that is placed at the entry point. Examining a packet, the
firewall system determines whether to allow the packet to proceed into the
enterprise network or to be rejected and prevented from entering the network.
Each firewall system is built on top of an underlying firewall F . The
firewall system determines whether to accept or reject an incoming packet
according to the rules in F . We now present the formal definition of firewall
F .
A firewall F is a sequence of rules where each rule is of the following
form:
〈sequence number〉 〈predicate〉 → 〈decision〉
Each rule in F consists of a sequence number, a predicate, and a de-
cision. The sequence number of each rule is a unique integer in the range
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from 1 to n, where n is the number of rules in F . The predicate of each rule
is defined using t attributes u1, u2, . . . , and ut. The decision of each rule is
either “accept” or “reject”.
An example of a firewall F that consists of three rules is as follows.
1
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(u1 ∈ [1, 9]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [1, 9])
)
→ reject
Note that the predicate of each rule in this firewall F is defined using
two attributes u1 and u2 whose integer values are taken from the integer in-
terval [1, 9]. The first rule in F is called rule 1, the second rule in F is called
rule 2, and so on.
A firewall can also be represented as a decision tree [7, 44, 74] or as a
finite automata [41] instead of as a sequence of rules.
Now consider two packets p and q where each packet is defined as a
tuple of two integers. Packet p is defined as the tuple (u1 = 3, u2 = 7) and
packet q is defined as the tuple (u1 = 2, u2 = 6). Packet p does not match
rule 1, but matches rule 2. So the first match rule in F for packet p is rule 2.
Similarly, packet q does not match rule 1 and rule 2. Rather it matches rule
3. So the first match rule in F for packet q is rule 3.
When a packet p matches more than one rule in firewall F , the decision
13
of the first match rule is applied to p. For example, Because the first rule in F
that matches q is rule 3 and because this rule has a decision “reject”, packet
q is rejected by firewall F .
2.1 Firewall Concepts
We now present formal definition for each of the following concepts:
Attributes, Predicates, Rules, Packets, First Match Rule and Complete Fire-
walls.
Attributes
An attribute is a “variable” that has a “name” and a “value”. We
denote t attributes as u1, u2, . . ., and ut. The value of each attribute ui is
taken from an interval that is called the domain of attribute ui and is denoted
D(ui).
Predicates
A predicate is of the form ((u1 ∈ X1) ∧ · · · ∧ (ut ∈ Xt)), where each ui
is an attribute, each Xi is an interval that is contained in the domain D(ui)
of attribute ui, and ∧ is the logical AND or conjunction operator.
A predicate ((u1 ∈ X1) ∧ · · · ∧ (ut ∈ Xt)), where each interval Xi is the
whole domain of the corresponding attribute ui, is called the ALL predicate.
Throughout this dissertation, we assume that the number of attributes,
t, in each rule is a fixed value. More precisely, we assume that each rule in
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any firewall is defined over five attributes: source IP address, destination IP
address, source port number, destination port number, and transport protocol.
Rules
A rule in a firewall F is defined as a tuple, a sequence number, a
predicate and a decision, written as follows:
〈sequence number〉 〈predicate〉 → 〈decision〉
The first rule in F is called rule 1, the second rule in F is called rule 2 and so
on.
We assume that there are two distinct decisions: “accept” and “reject”.
A rule whose decision is “accept” is called an accept rule, and a rule whose
decision is “reject” is called a reject rule. An accept rule whose predicate is the
ALL predicate is called an accept-ALL rule, and a reject rule whose predicate
is the ALL predicate is called the reject-ALL rule.
Packets
A packet is a tuple (b1, . . ., bt) of t integers, where t is the number of
attributes and each integer bi is taken from the domain D(ui) of attribute ui.
We adopt P to denote the set of all packets. Note that set P is finite.
Matching Rule
A packet p is said to match a rule in a firewall F iff the packet matches
the predicate of the rule.
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First Match Rule
A rule ri in a firewall F is called the first match rule in F for p iff the
following two conditions hold:
• packet p matches rule ri in F
• packet p does not match any of the rules r1, . . ., ri−1 in F
where, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and n is the number of rules in F .
We adopt the notation #(F, p) to denote the sequence number of the
first match rule in firewall F for a packet p.
A firewall F is said to accept, or reject respectively, a packet p iff the
rule whose sequence number is #(F, p) has a decision “accept” or “reject”
respectively.
Complete Firewalls
A firewall F is complete iff every packet is either accepted by F or
rejected by F . Throughout this dissertation, when we refer a firewall F , we
mean a complete firewall F .
Let F be a firewall. We adopt the notation not(F ) to denote the firewall
that is obtained from firewall F by (1) replacing each “accept” decision in F
by a “reject” decision in not(F ) and (2) replacing each “reject” decision in F
by an “accept” decision in not(F ).
Note that a firewall F is complete iff the firewall not(F ) is complete.
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2.2 A Firewall Example
Consider the network shown in Figure 2.1. This network has a firewall
system which is situated between the Internet and the enterprise network.
The enterprise network consists of a mail sever with IP address 192.168.0.1










Host 1 Host 2
Enterprise Network
192.168.0.1 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.3
Figure 2.1: An example firewall system and an enterprise network
The firewall system in Figure 2.1 is built on top of an underlying firewall
F . Suppose the requirement specification for F is given as follows.
1. The mail server, with IP address 192.168.0.1, can receive emails at port
25. Any other packet destined to the mail server is rejected.
2. Any packet originated from the malicious domain 172.23.0.0/16 destined
to the mail server, host 1 and host 2 should be rejected.
3. Host 1 can only receive TCP packets.
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4. Host 2 can receive both TCP and UDP packets.
In this example, we assume that each rule in F is defined over five
attributes: source IP address (u1), destination IP address (u2), source port
number (u3), destination port number (u4), and transport protocol (u5).
Domain of these attributes are defined as follows. The domain u1 and
u2 is the integer interval [0, 2
32−1] and the domain of u3 and u4 is the integer
interval [0, 100]. The domain of u5 is the integer interval [0, 1] where 0 denotes
that the transport protocol is UDP (user datagram protocol) and 1 denotes
that the transport protocol is TCP (transmission control protocol).
Firewall F can be defined with the following rules that satisfy the above
mentioned specification.
1 (u1 ∈ [172.23.0.0, 172.23.255.255]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [192.168.0.1, 192.168.0.3])
∧ (u3 ∈ [0, 100]) ∧ (u4 ∈ [0, 100]) ∧ (u5 ∈ [0, 1])→ reject
2 (u1 ∈ [0, 255.255.255.255]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [192.168.0.1, 192.168.0.1])
∧ (u3 ∈ [0, 100]) ∧ (u4 ∈ [25, 25]) ∧ (u5 ∈ [1, 1])→ accept
3 (u1 ∈ [0, 255.255.255.255]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [192.168.0.1, 192.168.0.1])
∧ ((u3 ∈ [0, 100]) ∧ (u4 ∈ [0, 100]) ∧ (u5 ∈ [0, 1])→ reject
4 (u1 ∈ [0, 255.255.255.255]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [192.168.0.2, 192.168.0.2])
∧ (u3 ∈ [0, 100]) ∧ (u4 ∈ [0, 100]) ∧ (u5 ∈ [1, 1])→ accept
5 (u1 ∈ [0, 255.255.255.255]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [192.168.0.2, 192.168.0.2])
∧ (u3 ∈ [0, 100]) ∧ (u4 ∈ [0, 100]) ∧ (u5 ∈ [0, 1])→ reject
6 (u1 ∈ [0, 255.255.255.255]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [192.168.0.3, 192.168.0.3])
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∧ ((u3 ∈ [0, 100]) ∧ (u4 ∈ [0, 100]) ∧ (u5 ∈ [0, 1])→ accept
7 (u1 ∈ [0, 255.255.255.255]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [0, 255.255.255.255])
∧ (u3 ∈ [0, 100]) ∧ (u4 ∈ [0, 100]) ∧ (u5 ∈ [0, 1])→ reject
The meaning of each of these rules is as follows.
• Rule 1 corresponds to the second specification. Any packet originated
from the malicious domain 172.23.0.0/16 is rejected.
• Rule 2 and 3 correspond to the first specification. Rule 2 says if a packet
p has a destination IP 192.168.0.1 and destination port 25, then p is
accepted. Rules 3 says if a packet p has a destination IP 192.168.0.1 but
the destination port is not 25, then p is rejected.
• Rule 4 and 5 correspond to the third specification. Rule 4 says if a
packet p has a destination IP 192.168.0.2 and the transport protocol is
TCP, then p is accepted. Rule 4 says if a packet p has a destination IP
192.168.0.2 and it is not accepted by Rule 4, then p is accepted.
• Rule 6 corresponds to the forth specification. Rule 5 says if a packet p
has a destination IP 192.168.0.3 and the transport protocol is TCP or
UDP, then p is accepted.
• Rule 7 ensures that if any packet p is not accepted by any of rules 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, and 6, then p is rejected.
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Now consider a packet p which is originated from a host with IP address
201.124.65.16 in the Internet and it is destined to the mail server in the enter-
prise network in Figure 2.1. Suppose p is defined as the tuple (201.124.65.16,
192.168.0.1, 90, 25, 0). When p attempts to enter the enterprise network, it
passes through the firewall system where p is examined against the rules of the
underlying firewall F . Packet p does not match rule 1 in F but matches rule 2.
Because rule 2 has a decision ‘accept’, packet p enters the enterprise network.
Note that the arrow between the firewall system and enterprise network and
the label (accept p or reject p) in Figure 2.1 are the symbolic representation of
the following logic: if the firewall system concludes that the decision for p is
‘reject’, then p is discarded at the firewall system and so cannot enter the en-
terprise network. Otherwise the firewall system concludes that the decision for
p is ‘accept’ and in this case the system forwards p to the enterprise network.
2.3 Literature Review of Firewalls
We divide the literature on firewalls into five categories: firewall design,
firewall analysis, property verification of firewalls, packet classification and
firewall outsourcing. A brief survey of the research that have been conducted
in the first four categories is in order. We review the research works that fall
in the category of firewall outsourcing in the next section.
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Firewall Design
A firewall should be carefully designed so that designed firewall adhere
to the design specification. Some prominent methods that can be used in
designing firewalls are reported in [28], [29], [44], [4], [56], and [54].
The method for designing firewalls in [28, 29] consists of two steps. First
the designer designs the desired firewall using a large conflict-free decision
diagram. Second the designer uses several algorithms to convert the large
decision diagram into a compact, yet functionally equivalent, sequence of rules.
This design method can be referred to as “simplifying firewalls by introducing
conflicts”.
The method for designing firewalls in [44] consists of three steps. First,
the same specification of the desired firewall is given to multiple teams who
independently design different versions of the firewall. Second, the resulting
multiple versions of the firewall are compared with one another. Third, all
discrepancies between the multiple firewall versions are resolved, and a final
firewall that is agreed upon by all teams is generated. This design method can
be referred to as “diverse firewall design”.
The method for designing firewalls in [4] consists of three steps. First,
the set of all expected packets is partitioned into non-overlapping subsets S1,
S2, · · · , Sk. Second, for each subset Si (obtained in the first step), design a
firewall Fi that accepts some of the packets in the subset Si. Third, identify
firewalls F1, F2, · · · , Fk generated in the second step as the desired firewall.
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This design methods can be referred to as “divide-and-conquer”.
The method for designing firewalls in [56] consists of k steps. First, the
designer starts with a simple firewall F1 that accepts more packets than the
designer wishes. Second, the designer designs a second firewall F2 such that
if any packet is accepted by F2 then the same packet is also accepted by F1.
This process is repeated k times until the designer reaches a firewall Fk that
accepts those packets and only those packets that the designer wishes to be
accepted. This design method can be referred to as “step-wise refinement”.
In [54], a bottom-up design method has been presented that can be
followed by a designer in designing firewalls. This design method proceeds as
follows. First, the designer designs several simple firewalls. Second, the de-
signer combines these simple firewalls using the three firewall operators “not”,
“and”, and “or” into a single firewall expression.
Firewall Analysis
Rule Anomaly Detection:
Firewall rules can be overlapping or disjoint. When rules are disjoint, the
ordering of the rules is insignificant. Two rules conflict when they are overlap-
ping and have conflicting decisions. It is possible that a packet matches both
of the two conflicting rules. In this case, firewall rules are assigned priority
and are ordered from higher priority to lower priority. The conflict is resolved
by choosing the first match rule. Thus finding the correct ordering of the rules
is very important and can be challenging when a firewall has large number of
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rules. Moreover, when the firewall contains a large number of rules, the pos-
sibility of writing conflicting or redundant rules is relatively high. Therefore,
it is of utmost importance to detect the conflicting rules in a firewall, as well
as other anomalies, such as existence of redundant rules, shadowed rules etc.
A classification of anomalies in a firewall, as well as algorithms to detect
them, is presented in a series of work [6–8] by Al-Shaer et. al. While in [8]
the authors defined intra-firewall anomalies, in [6, 7] the authors defined both
intra-firewall and inter-firewall anomalies. Besides classifying anomlaies, the
authors also proposed algorithms to detect and resolve these anomalies. These
works resulted in a tool called Firewall Policy Advisor. This tool can auto-
matically discover firewall rule anomalies after any rule insertion, removal, and
modification takes place, and can generate anomaly-free firewall. Like Fire-
wall Police Advisor, several other tools to detect and resolve firewall anomalies
have been proposed. FIREMAN [74] and FAME [35] are among these tools.
Firewall Policy Advisor only has the capability of detecting pairwise anoma-
lies in firewall rules. FIREMAN can detect anomalies among multiple rules by
analyzing the relationships between one rule and all preceding rules. FAME
considers all preceding and all subsequent rules when performing anomaly
analysis.
While the above mentioned works resolve anomalies preserving the pri-
ority order of the rules, the authors in [31] claims that resolving rule conflicts
based on prioritizing conflicting rules, and choosing the higher priority rule
does not always work. For example, they considered the case when each at-
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tribute in a rule is defined as a bit string. They proposed a scheme for conflict
resolution by modifying existing rules, inserting resolve rules and choosing
the best match rule. An linear space conflict detection technique has been
presented in [19].
The problem of detection and removal of firewall rule redundancy has
also been addressed in [3] and [45].
Vulnerability Analysis:
A firewall vulnerability is defined as an error made during firewall design, im-
plementation, or configuration, that can be exploited to attack the trusted
network that the firewall is supposed to protect [36]. Several methods for the
logical analysis of firewalls have been reported in [34, 36, 48, 50, 70], and [14].
A framework for understanding the vulnerabilities in a single firewall is out-
lined in [22], and an analysis of these vulnerabilities is presented in [36]. A
quantitative study of configuration errors for a firewall is presented in [70]. An
example of an efficient firewall analysis algorithm is given in FIREMAN [74].
An integrated analysis engine for firewalls in a network is given in Fang [48]
where the authors developed a firewall analysis tool to perform customized
queries on a set of filtering rules and to manually verify the correctness of
the firewall policy. A firewall test generation tool, called Blowtorch has been
presented in [34].
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Property Verification of Firewalls
Over the last couple of years, researchers have shown interest in deter-
mining several logical properties of a given firewall. Examples of some logical
properties include adequacy, implication, equivalence etc. Adequacy property
refers to problem of determining whether a given firewall accepts at least one
packet. Implication property refers to the problem of determining whether a
given firewall P accepts all packets that are accepted by another given firewall
Q. These properties have been formally defined in [18]. Also, it has been
shown in [18] that the problems of determining whether given firewalls defined
over any number of attributes satisfy some desired properties of adequacy,
implication, and equivalence are all NP-hard.
In [2], the authors present a polynomial time approach, called the PSP
method, to verify whether a given firewall satisfies a given logical property
(defined as a logical predicate) under the assumption that the number of at-
tributes in the firewall is fixed. PSP method has been later used to design a
polynomial time algorithm in [56] to solve the implication problem under the
assumption that the number of attributes in a rule in firewall is fixed. An
incremental verification approach has been presented in [17].
Besides the assumption of fixed number of attributes, there are two
main approaches to face the NP-hardness of determining whether given fire-
wall satisfy some desired properties of adequacy, implication, and equivalence.
The first approach is to use SAT solvers, for example as discussed in [33], [77],
and [5], to determine whether a given firewall satisfies some desired proper-
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ties of adequacy, implication, and equivalence. Note that the time complexity
of using SAT solvers is polynomial in most practical situations. The second
approach is to use probabilistic algorithms [1]. Note that the time complexi-
ties of probabilistic algorithms are always polynomial but unfortunately these
algorithms can yield wrong determinations in rare cases.
Moreover, the authors in [40, 41] investigated a novel representation of
firewalls as finite automata rather than as sequences of rules. They showed
later in [38], how to use the automata representation of a given firewall to
determine whether the given firewall satisfies some desired properties of ade-
quacy, implication, and equivalence.
Packet Classification
Given a packet p and a firewall F , a packet classification algorithm for
firewalls determines whether p is accepted or rejected according to the rules
in F .
When the firewall is represented as a sequence of rule, the simplest
algorithm is linear search of the firewall rules to determine the first match
rule for p. Linear search exhibits packet classification complexity of O(t × n)
where n is the number of rules in a firewall and t is the number of attributes.
Note that a firewall can also be represented as a decision tree [7, 44, 74]
or as a finite automata [41] instead of as a sequence of rules. So packet clas-
sification is not only limited to the linear search approach. Several other
packet classification approaches are decision tree methods (for example, Hyper-
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Cuts [63]), partitioning methods (for example, Tuple Space Search (TSS) [64]),
hybrid methods that use both decision trees and partitioning (for example,
Smartsplit [32], PartitionSort [72]), and TCAM-based methods [47].
Decision tree based classification algorithms [63] exhibit logarithmic
complexity in packet classification. However, updating a rule sometimes re-
quire reconstruction of the decision tree.
Partitioning methods, for example TSS [64], partitions the original rule-
set into smaller rulesets based on rule characteristics such that each partition
can be searched and updated in O(t) time where t is the number of attributes.
Although updating a rule is faster in TSS than that in decision tree approaches,
but classification time increases when the number of partitions increases be-
cause each partition must be searched for each packet.
Hybrid approaches [32, 72] use both the partition approach to partition
the ruleset and decision tree approach for searching each resulting ruleset. As
a result, hybrid approaches improve rule update time over decision tree meth-
ods as decision trees are constructed for smaller rulesets. Hybrid approaches
improve the classification time over partition methods by producing a smaller
number of partitions. A recent hybrid approach, Partition Sort [72] achieves
both logarithmic classification and logarithmic rule update time.
Ternary content addressable memories (TCAMs [47]) are used to per-
form high speed packet classification. A TCAM is a memory chip where each
entry can store a packet classification rule that is encoded in ternary format.
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Given a packet, the TCAM hardware can compare the packet with all stored
rules in parallel and then return the decision of the first rule that the packet
matches. Thus, it takes O(1) time to find the decision for any given packet.
Given a firewall, the problem of generating another semantically equivalent
firewall that requires fewer number of TCAM entries has been addressed in [46]
and [16].
2.4 Literature Review of Firewall Outsourcing
Firewall outsourcing started to gain attention because of the related
economic benefits since the first decade of the twenty-first century. Some
cloud service providers (CSP) or internet service providers (ISP), for example
AT&T, started to offer outsourced firewall systems as a service to enterprise
networks [15, 30, 58, 59, 69]. In such a service model, the firewall system of an
enterprise network is implemented and managed by the service provider. An
enterprise requires to provide its firewall rules to its CSP/ISP to configure the
firewall system. However, in this case enterprises do not have much control
over the design and execution of the outsourced system.
Since more and more enterprises were becoming interested in using
outsouced firewall systems, both academic and industry researchers became
interested in proposing models to design customized outsourced firewall sys-
tems for an enterprise network. As a result, starting from the beginning the
current decade, several models for outsourced firewall systems have been pro-
posed which enterprises can follow to design their own firewall systems using
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public clouds.
Some recent efforts in this area are surveyed in [67].
In 2012, Sherry et al. [61] studied the benefits outsourcing of firewall
systems by conducting a survey over 57 enterprise networks to estimate the
associated cost and complexity to implement and manage their firewall sys-
tems. They also proposed an architecture, called APLOMB, for outsourced
firewall systems for software defined network (SDN [21]). This system is de-
signed to be executed in a public cloud. They have argued that the enterprises
can reduce the associated cost and management complexity to implement and
manage their firewall systems by adopting APLOMB architecture for firewall
outsourcing.
In the same year, Gibb et al. [25] also proposed an outsourced firewall
system for software defined network (SDN). This system is designed to be ex-
ecuted in any location, for example, inside any local network or in a public
cloud, without requiring any changes in the design of the system. The enter-
prise network only requires to forward the packets to the location where the
firewall system is being executed. The location where the firewall system is
being executed can be geographically distant from the enterprise network.
The above mentioned outsourced systems provide the underlying fire-
wall in the clear to the public clouds and also do not verify that the task
executed by public clouds is indeed correct. Thus, these systems neither de-
fend against privacy attacks or verifiability attacks described in Section 1.2 in
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Chapter 1.
Towards the end of 2012, Khakpour and Liu [37] proposed an out-
sourced firewall system considering the fact that public clouds should not be
given the underlying firewall in the clear while outsourcing. Because if the
cloud knows the underlying firewall, it may leak that firewall to potential at-
tackers of the system. So they designed an outsourced firewall system where
the underlying firewall is encrypted before it is outsourced to the cloud. They
encrypt the underlying firewall in two steps. First, they use a Firewall Deci-
sion Diagram (FDD) [29] to represent the rules of the firewall. Second, they
use Bloom Filters [13] to represent edges of the FDD. Because the rules of the
underlying firewall are encrypted before they are outsourced to the cloud, the
cloud cannot know the rules of the underlying firewall and so cannot leak these
rules to potential attackers of the system. Their work was the first attempt to
design outsourced system when the underlying firewall is encrypted before it
is outsourced.
Following their work, several outsourced systems [42, 43, 49, 60, 62], and [68]
have been proposed afterwards that encrypt the underlying firewall while out-
sourcing to public clouds. Among these systems, the outsourced system in [43]
encrypts the packets that are sent to the public cloud as well as the underlying
firewall. Embark enables the cloud to check the encrypted packets against the
encrypted firewall. The system in [49] used partial homomorphic encryption.
This system also requires the packets to be encrypted before processing by the
cloud. However, encryption of packets are done by a trusted component of the
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public cloud. Other systems only encrypts the underlying firewall.
These systems differ from each other mainly in their architecture and
in the encryption mechanisms. For example, each of the outsourced systems
in [37, 43, 62] is executed by one public cloud, each of the outsourced systems
in [60, 68] is executed by two cooperative public clouds, and the outsourced
system in [42] is executed partially by a public cloud and partially by a private
cloud. Each of these systems aims to protect the underlying firewall from being
leaked to public clouds. Therefore, all of these systems defend against privacy
attacks. However, none of these systems verifies that the task executed by
a public cloud is indeed correct. Thus, these systems do not defend against
verifiability attacks.
A very few outsourced systems, for example, the systems in [20, 75],
and the system in [76], have been proposed in the literature that consider the
fact that the tasks that are executed by the public clouds need to be verified
at the enterprise end. Whereas the firewall systems in [75] and [76] execute the
verification steps online, the firewall system in [20] executes the verification
steps offline. However, the rules of the underlying firewall are stored in the
clear in the cloud in each of these systems. Therefore, these systems defend
against verifiability attacks but do not defend against privacy attacks.
The above mentioned efforts are mainly focused on outsourced firewall
systems. Besides there efforts, there exists a handful of research works that
deal with verifiability concerns in public cloud computing in general. Dif-
ferent verifiable computation schemes have been proposed over time such as
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trusted platform module [66], interactive proofs [26], probabilistic checkable
proofs [10], non-interactive verifiable computation [23] and so on. A brief sur-
vey of some these schemes are presented in [73]. In 2010, Gennaro et al. [23]
defined a non-interactive verifiable computation scheme for any function us-
ing Yao’s garbled circuit [71] combined with a fully homomorphic encryption
system [24]. This scheme is called the verifiable fully homomorphic encryption
(VFHE) which accounts for both privacy of outsourced computation and cor-
rectness of computed results. However, the problem of how to adopt VFHE in
an outsourced firewall system is still open. Melis et al. [49] used homomorphic
encryption to encrypt underlying firewall and incoming packets to design an
outsourced firewall system. But their system does not verify the correctness
of the computation executed by the public cloud.
Recent efforts have been made to discuss how to outsource systems of
access control policies, such as XACML polices [9], into public clouds [11, 12].





The material presented in this chapter is based on our paper [57]1. In
this chapter, we present a special class of firewall systems called outsourced
systems. Like a regular firewall system, an outsourced system consists of two
units: a rule matching unit and a decision unit. To simplify the architecture
of the outsourced system, the rule matching unit of this system is executed by
a public cloud C.
The architecture of the outsourced system is shown in Figure 3.1. Note
that the only difference between the regular firewall system in Figure 1.1 and
the outsourced system in Figure 3.1 is that the rule matching unit in the former
system is executed by the firewall system itself whereas the rule matching unit
in the latter system is executed by a public cloud C.
Using public cloud C to execute the rule matching unit of an outsourced
system has a number of benefits and some disadvantages. The benefits of using
1Rezwana Reaz, Ehab S. Elmallah, and Mohamed G. Gouda. Executing firewalls in pub-
lic clouds. In Proceedings of the 10th international conference computing, communication
and networking technologies (ICCCNT). IEEE, 2019. (Accepted for publication). Rezwana
Reaz is the only student author in this paper and contributed the most in this paper.
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cloud C to execute the rule unit are as follows [37, 58, 61, 69]. First, it can
reduce the initial investment and the operational cost of the firewall system by
taking advantage of the pay-per-use model of the cloud. Second, it can reduce
the number of staff needed to manage and implement the firewall system.
Third, it can increase the availability of the firewall system by maintaining
necessary back-ups.
The disadvantage of using public cloud C in executing the rule matching
unit is that cloud C is unreliable and so the outsourced system is vulnerable
to two types of attacks: verifiability attacks and privacy attacks. We describe
these two types of attacks in Section 3.3 below.
Prior work in this area [20, 37, 43, 60, 61, 75] yielded outsourced systems
that can defend against one of these two types of attacks, but none of the
systems can defend against both types of attacks. Our goal in this chapter is
to design outsourced systems that can prevent these two types of attacks from
occurring.
Table 3.1 classifies the prior outsourced systems into three categories:
(1) systems that do not defend against any attacks, (2) systems that can defend
only against verifiability attacks, and (3) systems that can defend only against
privacy attacks.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Prior Systems
Category Systems
Do not defend against [25] and [61]
any attacks
Can defend only against [20], [75], and [76]
verifiability attacks
Can defend only against [37], [42], [43], [60], [62], and [68]
privacy attacks
Can prevent This chapter
both attacks
3.2 Execution of Outsourced Systems
The architecture of an outsourced system whose underlying firewall is
F is shown in Figure 3.1. This outsourced system consists of two units: the
rule matching unit which is executed by a public cloud C, and the decision
unit which is executed by the firewall system. Both the rule matching unit
and the decision unit are built on top of the same underlying firewall F .
When a packet p attempts to pass this outsourced system, p is first
directed to cloud C which hosts the rule matching unit. Cloud C uses the
underlying firewall F to compute a sequence number v where v is the sequence
number #(F, p). Then, C forwards the pair (p, v) to the decision unit which
is executed by the firewall system.
The decision unit uses firewall F to compute the decision (“accept” or
“reject”) of the rule whose sequence number is #(F, p).
If the rule whose sequence number is #(F, p) has a decision “accept”,
then the decision unit forwards p to the enterprise network. Otherwise, the rule
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whose sequence number is #(F, p) has a decision “reject” and so the decision
discards packet p and does not forward it to the enterprise network.
3.3 Unreliable Public Clouds
A cloud C in the outsourced system is reliable iff C satisfies the fol-
lowing two conditions. First, when C sends a pair (p, v) to the decision unit,
value v is indeed the sequence number of the first match rule (rather than any
other match rule) in the underlying firewall F for packet p. Second, if C knows
the rules in F , C does not leak F to any potential attacker of the system.
The outsourced system in Figure 3.1 is correct only if the public cloud
C is reliable.
But cloud C is in fact unreliable. Hence, the outsourced system in Fig-
ure 3.1 is vulnerable to two types of attacks: verifiability attacks and privacy
attacks. We describe these two types of attacks next.
The verifiability attacks caused by cloud C can be described as follows.
When cloud C executes the steps to compute the sequence number #(F, p) of
the first match rule in the underlying firewall F for the incoming packet p, C
may compute a wrong value. In particular, the computed value v can be the
sequence number for a match but not for the first match rule in F for p.
The privacy attacks caused by cloud C can be described as follows. If
cloud C knows the rules of the underlying firewall F , C can leak the underlying
firewall F to any potential attacker of the firewall system.
36
As summarized in Table 3.1, all prior work on designing outsourced
firewall systems either defend against verifiability attacks or defend against
privacy attacks, but do not defend against both types of attacks. For example,
the outsourced systems in [20] and [76] defend against verifiability attacks, but
do not defend against privacy attacks. Also the outsourced systems in [37]
and [43] defend against privacy attacks but not against verifiability attacks.
We now discuss how to design an outsourced system that can prevent
both verifiability and privacy attacks from occurring. In the following two sec-
tions, we present two designs of outsourced systems. The first system is called
the verifiable firewall system. This system can prevent verifiability attacks
but cannot prevent privacy attacks. The second system is called the private
firewall system. This system can prevent both verifiability and privacy attacks
from occuring.
3.4 Verifiable Firewall Systems
The verifiable system in this section is obtained from the outsourced
system in Section 3.2 by performing the following three modifications. First,
cloud C in the outsourced system is replaced by two identical public clouds C1
and C2. Second, the rule matching unit that is hosted in cloud C is replaced
by two identical rule matching units that are hosted in clouds C1 and C2 as
shown in Figure 3.2. Third, the decision unit in the outsourced system is
replaced by a verifiable decision unit as shown in Figure 3.2.
Next, we describe the tasks that need to be performed by the verifiable
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decision unit.
When a packet p attempts to pass the verifiable system in Figure 3.2,
packet p is directed to the rule matching unit hosted in cloud C1 so that C1
can compute a sequence number v1 and send the pair (p, v1) to the verifiable
decision unit. Also, packet p is directed to the rule matching unit hosted in
cloud C2 so that C2 can compute a sequence number v2 and send the pair (p,
v2) to the verifiable decision unit.
Cloud C1 is supposed to compute v1 as equal to the sequence number
#(F, p) of the first match rule in F for p. But because C1 is a public cloud, and
so is unreliable, the computed value v1 can end up being the sequence number
of any match rule (not necessarily the first match rule) in F for p. Similarly,
cloud C2 is supposed to compute v2 as equal to the sequence number #(F, p)
of the first match rule in F for p. But because C2 is a public cloud, and so is
unreliable, the computed value v2 can end up being the sequence number of
any match rule (not necessarily the first match rule) in F for p.
If value vi computed by cloud Ci and sent to the verifiable decision unit
equals the sequence number #(F, p), then cloud Ci is said to “have told the
truth” to the verifiable decision unit. On the other hand, if value vi computed
by cloud Ci and sent to the verifiable decision unit is not equal to the sequence
number #(F, p), then cloud Ci is said to “have lied” to the verifiable decision
unit.





(p, v) from C
cloud C
accept p or 
reject p




(p, v1) from C1
cloud C1 rule matching cloud C2
(p, v2) from C2
accept p or 
reject p or
halt
Figure 3.2: Verifiable firewall system
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can tell the truth and enable the decision unit to detect that Ci has lied.
Two public clouds C1 and C2 are said to be non-colluding iff when
cloud C1 sends a pair (p, v1) and cloud C2 sends a pair (p, v2) to the decision
unit, then v1 and v2 can be different.
Note that if both clouds are sensible and non-colluding then neither
cloud will lie. This is because if one cloud, say C1, lies then there is a possibility
that the other cloud C2 does not lie and sends the sequence number #(F, p)
and hence enables the decision unit to detect that C1 has lied. In contrast,
if collusion occurs and the two clouds agree on sending the same sequence
number of a match rule then the two sensible clouds can lie simultaneously.
Theorem 3.4.1. Under the assumption that the two clouds C1 and C2 are
both sensible and non-colluding, the two pairs (p, v1) and (p, v2), computed
respectively by clouds C1 and C2, are such that both v1 and v2 equal the sequence
number #(F, p). This indicates that verifiability attack cannot occur in the
verifiable system.
Proof. There are three cases to consider.
1. Case 1: Cloud C1 has lied and cloud C2 may or may not have lied. In
this case, v1 is not equal to #(F, p). If v2 equals #(F, p), then v1 is
strictly greater than v2 and the decision unit can detect that cloud C1
has lied. By the assumption that C1 and C2 are non-colluding, v2 can be
#(F, p). In other words, C2 may have told the truth and have enabled
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the decision unit to detect that C1 has lied. By the assumption that C1
is sensible, C1 cannot lie in this case and so Case 1 is not possible.
2. Case 2: Cloud C2 has lied and cloud C1 may or may not have lied. In
this case, v2 is not equal to #(F, p). If v1 equals #(F, p), then v2 is
strictly greater than v1 and the decision unit can detect that cloud C2
has lied. By the assumption that C1 and C2 are non-colluding, v1 can be
#(F, p). In other words, C1 may have told the truth and have enabled
the decision unit to detect that C2 has lied. By the assumption that C2
is sensible, C2 cannot lie in this case and so Case 2 is not possible.
3. Case 3: Neither C1 nor C2 has lied. If cloud C1 lies, then this case is
Case 1 and Case 1 is not possible by the assumption that cloud C1 is
sensible. Similarly, If cloud C2 lies, then this case is Case 2 and Case 2
is not possible by the assumption that cloud C2 is sensible. Therefore,
neither C1 nor C2 has lied which makes Case 3 possible.
Since Case 3 is the only possible case, each cloud send the sequence
number #(F, p) to the decision unit. This indicates that verifiability attack
cannot occur.
From Theorem 3.4.1, each of the two sequence numbers v1 and v2 sent
to the verifiable decision unit respectively by clouds C1 and C2, is equal to the
sequence number #(F, p). Thus, the verifiable system prevents verifiability
attacks from occurring.
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Although the two sequence number v1 and v2 are expected to be equal
when the verifiable decision receives them, v1 and v2 can be different if any
of these two sequence numbers gets corrupted before it reaches the verifiable
decision unit. If the decision unit detects that v1 and v2 are not equal, then
the decision unit concludes that corruption of v1 or v2 has occurred. In this
case, the decision unit discards packet p and puts the verifiable system into a
halt so that no more incoming packets can be allowed to enter the verifiable
system.
Therefore, after the verifiable decision unit receives the two pairs (p,
v1) and (p, v2), the decision unit is required to compare the two sequence
numbers v1 and v2 to check whether they are equal or they are not equal
indicating that a corruption has occurred. If the two values are equal, then
the decision unit uses the underlying firewall F to compute the decision of
the rule whose sequence number is v1. If the decision of this rule is “accept”,
then the verifiable decision unit forwards packet p to the enterprise network.
Otherwise, the decision of this rule is “reject” and so the decision unit discards
packet p.
3.5 Private Firewall Systems
The verifiable system that is discussed in the previous section prevents
verifiability attacks but is still vulnerable to privacy attacks caused by the
fact that cloud Ci which hosts the rule matching unit of the verifiable system,
knows the the underlying firewall F . Because Ci is unreliable, Ci can leak the
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underlying firewall F to any potential attacker of the system.
To prevent privacy attacks from occurring, we design the private firewall
system from the verifiable system presented in the previous section as follows.
We replace each rule matching unit that uses firewall F by a rule matching
unit that uses the incomplete version IF of F .
The incomplete version IF of F is the same as F except that the
decisions of all the rules in IF are unspecified. For example, if the underlying
firewall F is as follows:
1
(










(u1 ∈ [1, 9]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [1, 9])
)
→ reject
then the incomplete version IF of F is as follows:
1
(










(u1 ∈ [1, 9]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [1, 9])
)
→ unspecified
The first rule in this example of IF is called incomplete rule 1, the
second rule in IF is called incomplete rule 2, and so on. Now consider two
packets p and q where p is defined as the tuple (u1 = 3, u2 = 7) and q is defined
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as the tuple (u1 = 2, u2 = 6). Packet p does not match incomplete rule 1,
but matches incomplete rule 2. So the first match incomplete rule in IF for
p is the incomplete rule 2. Similarly, packet q does not match incomplete rule
1 and incomplete rule 2. Rather it matches incomplete rule 3. So the first
match incomplete rule in IF for q is the incomplete rule 3.
We adopt the notation #(IF, p) to denote the sequence number of
the first match incomplete rule in IF for packet p. For example, the sequence
number #(IF, p) is 2 and the sequence number #(IF, q) is 3. Observe that the
sequence number #(F, p) is equal to the sequence number #(IF, p). Therefore,
the notations #(IF, p) and #(F, p) can be used interchangeably.
A packet p that attempts to pass the private system whose underlying
firewall is F , is first directed to each of the rule matching units hosted in clouds
C1 and C2. Each rule matching unit in the private system uses the incomplete
firewall IF instead of the complete firewall F and computes the sequence
number #(IF, p) which equals the sequence number #(F, p) . Each cloud Ci
then sends its computed value #(F, p) to the verifiable decision unit along
with packet p. The verifiable decision unit of the private system computes the
decision for p in the same way the verifiable decision unit does in the verifiable
system.
Note that in the private system, for each incoming packet p, each cloud
knows the sequence number #(F, p) but does not know the decision of the rule
whose sequence number is #(F, p). Therefore, neither cloud knows the rules
of F and so cannot leak these rules to potential attackers.
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Based on these discussions, correctness of the private system is obtained
from Theorem 3.5.1.
Theorem 3.5.1. Each cloud Ci in the verifiable system knows the underlying
firewall F and can leak F to potential attackers of the system. By contrast, no
cloud Ci in the private system knows the underlying firewall F and so cannot
leak F to potential attackers of the system. This indicates that no privacy
attack can occur in the private system.
3.6 Chapter Summary
Our contributions in this chapter are two folds. First, we present a
family of firewall systems which is shown in Figure 3.3. Each member in this
family consists of a rule matching unit and a decision unit. The firewall system
without outsourcing executes the tasks of the rule matching unit and the
decision unit without any help from a public cloud. In contrast, the outsourced
system outsources the rule matching unit to a public cloud.
Unfortunately, public clouds are unreliable which makes the outsourced
system vulnerable to two types of attacks: verifiability attacks and privacy at-
tacks. To prevent these attacks from occurring, we present designs of two
outsourced systems: the verifiable system and the private system. The verifi-
able system outsources the task of the rule matching unit to two public clouds
and can prevent verifiability attacks under the assumption that both clouds are




Firewall System without Outsourcing Outsourced Firewall System
Verifiable Firewall System
Private Firewall System
Figure 3.3: Our family of firewall systems
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Our second contribution in this chapter is a presentation of the private
system which can prevent both verifiability and privacy attacks from occurring.
Prior work on designing outsourced systems using public clouds either defend
against verifiability attacks, for example [20] and [75], or defend against privacy
attacks, for example [37] and [60], but do not defend against both attacks.
The private system presented in this chapter uses two public clouds
and can prevent both verifiability and privacy attacks under the assumption
that the two public clouds are sensible and non-colluding. An extension of
the work presented in this chapter is to design an outsourced system that can
prevent both verifiability and privacy attacks under the assumption that the
two public clouds can be colluding.
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Chapter 4
Outsourcing of Partially Specified Firewalls
So far we defined the decision of a rule in a firewall to be either “accept”
or “reject”. In this chapter, we consider firewalls where the decision of each
rule is “accept”, “reject”, or “unspecified”. We refer to this class of firewalls
as partially specified firewalls and discuss techniques for outsourcing partially
specified firewalls.
An example of a partially specified firewall PF is as follows.
1
(




















(u1 ∈ [1, 9]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [1, 9])
)
→ reject
Note that this partially specified firewall has two attributes u1 and u2
and the domain of each attribute is the integer interval [1, 9]. The decision of
each rule is either “accept”,“reject”, or “unspecified”.
A packet p is said to be accepted or rejected respectively by a partially
specified firewall PF iff PF has an accept rule or reject rule r that matches
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packet p and all the rules that match p and precede r in PF are unspecified
rules. For example, packet p (u1 = 3, u2 = 7) is accepted by the partially
unspecified firewall PF mentioned above because PF has an accept rule, rule
4 that matches packet p and all the rules that match p and precede rule 4 in
PF are unspecified rules.
A partially specified firewall PF is said to be complete iff each packet
p is either “accepted” or “rejected” by PF . For example, the above partially
specified firewall is complete.
From now on, whenever we mention a partially specified firewall we
mean a complete partially specified firewall.
A partially specified firewall PF is equivalent to a firewall F iff every
packet p that is accepted or rejected by PF respectively is also accepted or
rejected by F respectively, and vice versa.
Theorem 4.0.1. For every partially specified firewall PF there exists a firewall
F such that PF and F are equivalent.
Proof. Let PF be a partially specified firewall and let F be the firewall that is
obtained from PF by removing all unspecified rules in PF . From definition of a
packet p being accepted or rejected respectively by a partially specified firewall
PF , packet p is accepted or rejected respectively by PF iff p is accepted or
rejected respectively by F . Therefore, firewall F is equivalent to the partially
specified firewall PF .
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We now discuss how to modify a firewall system when the underlying
firewall is a partially specified firewall PF . The architecture of a firewall
system has been presented in Figure 1.1 which consists of a rule matching
unit and a decision unit. When the underlying firewall is a partially specified
firewall, then the task of rule matching unit has to be redefined as follows.
For any packet p, the rule matching unit requires to compute the se-
quence number of the ‘first match rule that has a decision either accept or
reject’ in PF for p. Note that ‘first match rule that has a decision either ac-
cept or reject’ in PF for p is not necessarily the sequence number of the ‘first
match rule’ in PF for p. After computing the sequence number of the ‘first
match rule that has a decision either accept or reject’ the rule matching unit
sends this sequence number to the decision unit and the decision unit applies
the decision of this rule to p.
Above design of the firewall system whose underlying firewall is a par-
tially specified firewall PF suggests that the rule matching unit needs to know
the decisions of the rules of PF . This makes the design of an outsourced sys-
tem for a partially specified firewall PF challenging because the outsourced
systems presented in this dissertation require that the rule matching units are
executed in clouds and clouds do not know the decision of the rules of the
underlying firewall.
An alternative way to design an outsourced system for a partially spec-
ified firewall PF is to find an equivalent firewall F and design the outsourced
system for F . From Theorem 4.0.1 for any PF there exists a firewall F such
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that PF and F are equivalent.
We now design an outsourced system for a partially specified firewall
PF in two steps.
• In the first step, we obtain a firewall F from the partially specified firewall
PF by removing all unspecified rules such that PF and F are equivalent.
• In the second step, we design a private system presented in Chapter 3
for underlying firewall F obtained in the first step. The designed pri-
vate system for firewall F is the desired outsourced system for partially





The material presented in this chapter is based on our papers [54, 55]1.
In this chapter, we present a generalization of firewalls called firewall expres-
sions. A firewall expression is specified using one or more firewalls and the three
firewall operators: “not”, “and”, and “or”. We show that firewall expressions
can be utilized to support bottom-up methods for designing firewalls. We also
show that each firewall expression can be represented by a set of special types
of firewalls, called slices. Moreover, we present several algorithms that use the
slice representation of given firewall expressions to verify whether the given
firewall expressions satisfy logical properties such as adequacy, implication,
and equivalence.
We now present examples of two firewalls G and H and use these ex-
amples to introduce the concept of “firewall expressions”.
1Rezwana Reaz, H. B. Acharya, Ehab S. Elmallah, Jorge A. Cobb, and Mohamed G
Gouda. Policy expressions and the bottom-up design of computing policies. Computing,
101(9):13071326, 2019. Rezwana Reaz is the only student author in this paper and the main
contributor in this paper.
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Let firewall G consists of three rules which are defined as follows:
(
(u1 ∈ [1, 4]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [8, 9])
)
→ reject(
(u1 ∈ [2, 4]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [7, 9])
)
→ accept(
(u1 ∈ [1, 9]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [1, 9])
)
→ reject
The predicate of each rule in this firewall G is defined using two at-
tributes u1 and u2 whose integer values are taken from the integer interval [1,
9]. The first rule states that each packet (b1, b2), where the value of b1 is an
integer in the interval [1, 4] and where the value of b2 is an integer in the in-
terval [8, 9], is to be rejected. The second rule states that each packet (b1, b2),
that does not match the first rule and where the value of b1 is an integer in
the interval [2, 4] and where the value of b2 is an integer in the interval [7, 9],
is to be accepted. The third rule states that each packet (b1, b2) that does not
match the first two rules is to be rejected. Thus, the set of packets that are
accepted by firewall G is {(2, 7), (3, 7), (4, 7)}. Notice that because the third
rule rejects all packets that do not match the first two rules.
A second firewall H that consists of three rules, where each rule is
defined over attributes u1 and u2, is as follows:
(
(u1 ∈ [2, 3]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [7, 7])
)
→ accept(
(u1 ∈ [2, 4]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [7, 8])
)
→ accept(




r The set of packets that are accepted by H is {(2, 7), (3, 7), (4, 7), (2, 8), (3, 8), (4, 8)}
and all other packets are rejected.
Now assume that we need to use the two given firewalls G and H to
design a firewall expression (G or H). This firewall expression accepts every
packet that is accepted by firewall G or accepted by firewall H. Thus, the set of
packets that is accepted by (G or H) is {(2, 7), (3, 7), (4, 7), (2, 8), (3, 8), (4, 8)}.
Firewalls G and H are called the component firewalls of the firewall expression
(G or H).
In this chapter, we show that every firewall expression that is specified
using one or more firewalls and the three firewall operators “not”, “and”, and
“or” can be represented by a set {S1, S2, · · · , Sk} of a special class of firewalls
called slices such that the following condition holds. A packet is accepted by
a firewall expression iff this packet is accepted by at least one slice in the set
of slices that represents the firewall expression.
As an example, the firewall expression (G or H) can be represented
by the set of three slices {S1, S2, S3} according to Algorithm 4 presented in
Section 5.4.
Slice S1 is defined as follows:(
(u1 ∈ [1, 4]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [8, 9])
)
→ reject(
(u1 ∈ [2, 4]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [7, 9])
)
→ accept
Slice S2 is defined as follows:(




Slice S3 is defined as follows:
(
(u1 ∈ [2, 4]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [7, 8])
)
→ accept
(Notice that, as discussed in Section 5.4, each slice is a firewall that
consists of zero or more reject rules followed by exactly one accept rule.)
Similarly, consider a firewall expression (G and H). This firewall ex-
pression accepts any packet p iff both polices G and H accept p. The firewall
expression (G and H) can be represented by the set of two slices {S4, S5}
according to Algorithm 3 presented in Section 5.4.
Slice S4 is defined as follows:
(
(u1 ∈ [1, 4]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [8, 9])
)
→ reject(
(u1 ∈ [2, 3]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [7, 7])
)
→ accept
Slice S5 is defined as follows:
(
(u1 ∈ [1, 4]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [8, 9])
)
→ reject(
(u1 ∈ [2, 4]) ∧ (u2 ∈ [7, 8])
)
→ accept
Based on the above discussions, this chapter suggests a novel bottom-
up design method that can be followed by a designer in designing firewalls.
This design method proceeds as follows. First, the designer designs several
simple component firewalls. Second, the designer combines these component
firewalls using the three firewall operators “not”, “and”, and “or” into a single
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firewall expression FE. Finally, the designer uses the algorithms in Section 6
below to determine that the designed firewall expression FE is adequate, and
that FE implies or is equivalent to a desired firewall expression.
As an example, a designer can start by designing two firewalls G and H,
then use these two firewalls to design the firewall expression (G and not(H)).
This firewall expression accepts every packet that is accepted by firewall G and
rejected by firewall H. Then the designer can use Algorithm 7 in Section 5.5
below to prove that this firewall expression implies both firewall G and firewall
not(H).
Other methods that can be used in designing firewalls are reported in
[28], [29], [44], [56], and [4]. A brief survey of these methods has been presented
in Chapter 2.
These design methods, along with the bottom-up method in the current
chapter can constitute a library of firewall design methods. When designing a
firewall, it is up to the designer to decide which design method in this library
will the designer follow to generate the desired firewall.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we
present our formal definition of firewall expressions and discuss three theorems
that state fundamental properties of firewall expressions. In Section 5.3, we
discuss an algorithm that can be used to evaluate a given firewall expression
for any input stream of packets. In Section 5.4, we introduce the concept of
a base of a firewall expression as a set of slices that satisfies the following
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condition. For every incoming packet p, the firewall expression accepts p iff
at least one slice in the base of the firewall expression accepts p. Also in
Section 5.4, we present algorithms for constructing a base for every firewall
expression. In Section 5.5, we show that the bases of given firewall expressions
can be used to determine whether the given firewall expressions satisfy some
logical properties such as adequacy, implication, and equivalence. Finally, we
conclude this chapter in Section 5.6.
5.2 Definition of Firewall Expressions
In this section, we define firewall expressions. Informally, a firewall
expression is specified using one or more firewalls and three firewall operators:
“not”, “and”, and “or”. Each one of these firewall operators can be applied
to one or two firewall expressions to produce a firewall expression.
Formally, a 〈firewall expression FE〉 is defined recursively as one of the
following four options:
A complete firewall G
A complete firewall not(G)
〈firewall expression FE1〉 and 〈firewall expression FE2〉
〈firewall expression FE1〉 or 〈firewall expression FE2〉
An example of a firewall expression is as follows:
(G and not(H)) or (not(G) and H)
In this example, G and H are complete firewalls and are called component
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firewalls of the firewall expression. Also “not”, “and”, and “or” are called
firewall operators.
Associated with each firewall expression FE is a packet set PS defined
as follows:
• If FE is a complete firewall G,
then PS is the set of all packets accepted by G
• If FE is a complete firewall not(G),
then PS is the set of all packets accepted by not(G) or equivalently PS
is the set of all packets rejected by G
• If FE is a firewall expression (FE1 and FE2),
then PS is the intersection of two packet sets PS1 and PS2 where PS1 is
the packet set associated with FE1 and PS2 is the packet set associated
with FE2
• If FE is a firewall expression (FE1 or FE2),
then PS is the union of two packet sets PS1 and PS2 where PS1 is the
packet set associated with FE1 and PS2 is the packet set associated with
FE2
As an example, the packet set associated with the firewall expression (G and
not(H)) is the intersection of the two packet sets PS1 and PS2, where PS1 is
the set of all packets accepted by firewall G and PS2 is the set of all packets
accepted by firewall not(H).
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Two firewall expressions FE1 and FE2 are said to be equivalent iff the
two packet sets associated with FE1 and FE2 are identical.
For example, the firewall expression (G and not(H)) and the firewall
expression (not(G) and H) are equivalent.
Let FE be a firewall expression. We adopt the notation not(FE) to
denote the firewall expression that is recursively obtained from FE as follows:
• If FE is a complete firewall G,
then not(FE) denotes the firewall expression not(G)
• If FE is a complete firewall not(G),
then not(FE) denotes the firewall expression G
• If FE is a firewall expression (FE1 and FE2),
then not(FE) denotes the firewall expression (not(FE1) or not(FE2))
• If FE is a firewall expression (FE1 or FE2),
then not(FE) denotes the firewall expression (not(FE1) and (FE2))
As an example, not
(





(not(G) or H) and (G or not(H))
)
.
The following three theorems state fundamental properties of firewall
expressions.
Theorem 5.2.1. For every firewall expression FE, (1) the packet set associ-
ated with the firewall expression (FE and not(FE)) is the empty set, and (2)
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the packet set associated with the firewall expression (FE or not(FE)) is the
set P of all packets.
Proof. Our proof of this theorem makes use of the following definition of the
“rank” of a firewall expression FE.
The rank k of a firewall expression FE is a non-negative integer defined
recursively as follows:
• If FE is a complete firewall G or is a complete firewall not(F ), then
k = 0
• If FE is of the form (FE1 and FE2) or is of the form (FE1 or FE2),
then k = (1 + max(k1, k2)), where k1 is the rank of FE1 and k2 is the
rank of FE2
Our proof of this theorem is by induction on the rank k of the firewall
expression FE. Details of this proof are presented in [53].
Theorem 5.2.2. For every firewall expression FE, the packet set associated
with the firewall expression not(FE) is (P − PS), where P is the set of all
packets, PS is the packet set associated with FE, and “−” is the set difference
operator. (Note that the packet set (P −PS) can be written as the compliment
of set PS.)
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Proof. Let NS denote the packet set associated with not(FE). Thus, the
packet set associated with the firewall expression (FE and not(FE)) is (PS
⋂
NS),
and the packet set associated with the firewall expression (FE or not(FE)) is
(PS
⋃
NS). Hence, from Theorem 1, the set (PS
⋂
NS) is empty and the set
(PS
⋃
NS) is the set P of all packets. Therefore, set NS is (P − PS).
A firewall expression FE is said to be complete iff for every packet p
either FE accepts p or FE rejects p.
Theorem 5.2.3. Every firewall expression is complete.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there is a firewall expression
FE that is not complete. Thus, there is a packet p such that FE neither
accepts p nor rejects p. Hence, from Theorem 2, packet p is neither in the
packet set PS associated with FE nor in the packet set (P − PS) associated
with not(FE). Therefore, packet p is not in the union of the two sets PS and
(P −PS), which constitutes the set P of all packets. This contradicts the fact
that p is a packet in the set P of all packets.
5.3 Evaluation of Firewall Expressions
In this section, we discuss an algorithm that takes as input any given
firewall expression FE and any given packet p and produces as output a de-
termination of whether or not FE accepts p. This algorithm can be used to
evaluate the given firewall expression FE for any input stream of packets.
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The main idea of this algorithm is to use the input pair (p, FE) to pro-
duce a Boolean expression BE, that involves the two Boolean values “TRUE”
and “FALSE”, and the three Boolean operators “¬”, “∧”, and “∨”.
The Boolean expression BE corresponding to the pair (p, FE) is re-
quired to satisfy one of the following two conditions:
• (FE accepts p) iff (BE is TRUE)
• (FE rejects p) iff (BE is FALSE)
Now consider a firewall expression FE and a packet p as follows:
FE = (G and (H or I)) or not(H)
where G, H, and I are complete firewalls. Assume that G accepts p, H rejects
p, and I rejects p. The Boolean expression BE corresponding to the pair (p,
FE) can be constructed as follows:
• Because G accepts p, replace firewall G in FE by the Boolean value
TRUE in BE
• Because H rejects p, replace firewall H in FE by the Boolean value
FALSE in BE
• Because I rejects p, replace firewall I in FE by the Boolean value FALSE
in BE
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• Replace the firewall operator “not” in FE by the Boolean operator “¬”
in BE
• Replace the firewall operator “and” in FE by the Boolean operator “∧”
in BE
• Replace the firewall operator “or” in FE by the Boolean operator “∨”
in BE
• The Boolean expression BE can now be computed as follows:
BE = (TRUE ∧ (FALSE ∨ FALSE)) ∨ ¬FALSE
= FALSE ∨ TRUE = TRUE
Because BE is TRUE, we conclude that the given firewall expression
FE accepts the given packet p.
Next, we discuss the time complexity for computing the Boolean ex-
pression BE that represents a given firewall expression FE and a given packet
p. Assume that the given firewall expression FE has m distinct firewalls and
k firewall operators. Also assume that each distinct firewall has t attributes
(t is usually 5 for firewalls) and at most n rules. Therefore, the time com-
plexity to determine whether each distinct firewall in FE accepts the given
packet p is O(n × t). The “length” of the constructed Boolean expression
BE is O(k). Thus, the time complexity to construct the Boolean expression
is O((n × t × m) + (m × k)). Also, the time complexity of computing
the Boolean value of BE is O(k2) [51]. Therefore, the time complexity for
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constructing the Boolean expression BE and computing its Boolean value is
O((n × t × m) + ((m × k) + k2)).
5.4 Bases of Firewall Expressions
In the next section, Section 5.5, we discuss several properties of fire-
wall expressions and present algorithms to determine whether given firewall
expressions satisfy these properties. For example, we present algorithms to
determine whether any given two firewall expressions are equivalent.
Our discussion in Section 5.5 is based on two concepts, namely “slices”
and “bases of firewall expressions” that we introduce in the current section.
A slice is a firewall that consists of zero or more reject rules followed
by exactly one accept rule.
Let SS be a set of slices and let FE be a firewall expression. Set SS
is said to be a base of the firewall expression FE iff the following condition
holds. Each packet p is accepted by at least one slice in set SS iff p is in the
packet set associated with the firewall expression FE.
The following five algorithms can be applied to any firewall expression
FE to construct a slice set SS that is a base of FE.
Algorithm 1
Input: A complete firewall G
Output: A slice set SS that is a base of G
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Steps: For each accept rule ar in G, construct a slice sl in SS as follows. All
the reject rules that precede rule ar in G are added to slice sl. Then rule ar
is added at the end of slice sl.
Correctness: Proof of Correctness is presented in [53].
Time Complexity: A slice may contain up to n rules where n is the number
of rules in the input firewall G and adding one rule to a slice takes O(t) steps
where t is the number of attributes in G. So the time complexity to construct
each slice is O(n × t). There can be at most n slices in SS, one for each accept
rule in G. Therefore, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is of O(n2 × t) where
n is the number of rules and t is the number of attributes in G.
End
Algorithm 2
Input: A complete firewall not(G)
Output: A slice set SS that is a base of not(G)
Steps: For each accept rule ar in not(G), construct a slice sl in SS as follows.
All the reject rules that precede rule ar in not(G) are added to slice sl. Then
rule ar is added at the end of slice sl.
Correctness: The correctness proof of Algorithm 2 is same as the correctness
proof of Algorithm 1.
Time Complexity: The time complexity of Algorithm 2 is same as the time




Input: A firewall expression FE of the form (FE1 and FE2)
A slice set SS1 that is a base of FE1
A slice set SS2 that is a base of FE2
Output: A slice set SS that is a base of FE
Steps: For every slice sl1 in SS1 and every slice sl2 in SS2, construct a slice
sl in SS as follows:
1. The reject rules of slice sl are constructed by merging the reject rules of
sl1 with the reject rules of sl2 in any order
2. The accept rule of slice sl is constructed by taking the intersection of the
predicates of the two accept rules of slices sl1 and sl2. If this intersection
is empty, then discard slice sl from the base SS of the firewall expression
FE.
Correctness: Proof of Correctness is presented in [53].
Time Complexity: The number of slices in SS is (m1 × m2) where m1 is
the number of slices in SS1 and m2 is the number of slices in SS2. The time
complexity to construct a slice in SS is of O(n1 × t + n2 × t), where n1
is the number of rules in the largest slice in SS1, n2 is the number of rules in
the largest slice in SS2 and t is the number of attributes. Therefore, the time
complexity of Algorithm 3 is of O((m1 ×m2) × (n1 × t + n2 × t)) where
m1 is the number of slices in SS1, m2 is the number of slices in SS2, n1 is the
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number of rules in the largest slice in SS1, n2 is the number of rules in the
largest slice in SS2, and t is the number of attributes.
End
Algorithm 4
Input: A firewall expression FE of the form (FE1 or FE2)
A slice set SS1 that is a base of FE1
A slice set SS2 that is a base of FE2
Output: A slice set SS that is a base of FE
Steps: The slice set SS is constructed as the union of the two slice sets SS1
and SS2.
Correctness: Proof of Correctness is presented in [53].
Time Complexity: The time complexity of Algorithm 4 is the sum of the
time complexity to add all slices of SS1 to SS and the time complexity to add
all slices of SS2 to SS. The time complexity to add each slice of SS1 to SS is
of O(n1 × t), where n1 is the number of rules in the largest slice in SS1 and t is
the number of attributes. Similarly, The time complexity to add each slice of
SS2 to SS is of O(n2 × t), where n2 is the number of rules in the largest slice
in SS2. Therefore, The time complexity of Algorithm 4 is of O((m1×n1 × t)
+ (m2 × n2 × t)) where m1 is the number of slices in SS1, m2 is the number
of slices in SS2, n1 is the number of rules in the largest slice in SS1, n2 is the




Input: A firewall expression FE
Output: A slice set SS that is a base of FE
Steps: SS is constructed by recursively applying the following four steps:
1. If FE is a complete firewall G then use Algorithm 1 to construct SS as
a base of G
2. If FE is a complete firewall not(G) then use Algorithm 2 to construct
SS as a base of not(G)
3. If FE is (FE1 and FE2) and SS1 is a base of FE1 and SS2 is a base
of FE2 then use Algorithm 3 to construct SS as a base of FE from the
two slice sets SS1 and SS2
4. If FE is (FE1 or FE2) and SS1 is a base of FE1 and SS2 is a base of FE2
then use Algorithm 4 to construct SS as a base of firewall expression
FE from the two slice sets SS1 and SS2
Correctness: The correctness proof of Algorithm 5 follows from the correct-
ness proofs of Algorithms 1, 2, 3 and 4.
Time Complexity: The time complexity of Algorithm 5 depends on the
number and type of operators in the input firewall expression FE. The time




5.5 Properties of Firewall Expressions
In this section, we present several important properties of firewall ex-
pressions (namely adequacy, implication, and equivalence) and present algo-
rithms that can be used to determine whether any given firewall expression
satisfies these properties.
A firewall expression FE is said to be adequate iff FE accepts at least
one packet. The following algorithm can be used to determine whether any
given firewall expression is adequate.
Algorithm 6
Input: A firewall expression FE
Output: A determination of whether FE accepts a packet.
Steps: Construct a base SS of the firewall expression FE using Algorithm
5. For each slice in the constructed base SS, determine whether this slice
accepts a packet using the Probing Algorithm [53]. If one or more slices in SS
accepts a packet, then FE accepts a packet. Otherwise, FE does not accept
any packet.
Time Complexity: Let T denote the time complexity of Algorithm 5 when
applied to the input firewall expression to construct its base SS. Also let m be
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the number of slices in the constructed base SS and n be the number of rules
in the largest slice in SS. As showed in [53], the time complexity of Probing
Algorithm to determine whether a slice of n rules and t attributes accepts a
packet is of O(nt+1 × t). Therefore, the time complexity of Algorithm 6 is of
O(T + (m × (nt+1 × t))).
End
A firewall expression FE1 is said to imply a firewall expression FE2 iff
the packet set associated with the firewall expression (FE1 and not(FE2)) is
empty. (Note that FE1 implies FE2 iff every packet that is accepted by FE1
is also accepted by FE2.)
Theorem 5.5.1. FE1 implies FE2 iff the packet set PS1 associated with FE1
is a subset of the packet set PS2 associated with FE2.
Proof. Proof of the Only-If-Part: Assume that FE1 implies FE2. Thus,
the packet set associated with the firewall expression (FE1 and not(FE2))
is empty. From Theorem 2, the packet set associated with not(FE2) is the






is empty and PS1 is a subset of PS2.
Proof of the If-Part: Assume that the packet set PS1 associated with





, where P is the set of all packets, is empty. From Theorem 2,
the packet set associated with not(FE2) is the set (P − PS2). Therefore,
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the packet set associated with the firewall expression (FE1 and not(FE2)) is
empty and FE1 implies FE2.
Algorithm 7
Input: Two firewall expressions FE1 and FE2
Output: A determination of whether FE1 implies FE2
Steps: First, construct a firewall expression FE from the firewall expression
(FE1 and not(FE2)) by recursively applying “not” to firewall expression FE2
until “not” is applied only to the constituent component firewalls of FE2. Sec-
ond, use Algorithm 6 to determine whether the constructed firewall expression
FE accepts a packet. From the definition of “implies”, if FE accepts no packet
then FE1 implies FE2. Otherwise, FE1 does not imply FE2.
Time Complexity: The time complexity of the first step of Algorithm 7 is
dominated by the time complexity of the second step which uses Algorithm 6.
Therefore, the time complexity of Algorithm 7 is of O(T + (m × nt+1 × t)),
where T is the time complexity for constructing the firewall expression FE
and its base SS, m is the number of slices in the constructed base SS, n is
number of rules in the largest slice in SS, and t is the number of attributes in
each slice in SS.
End
Theorem 5.5.2. Two firewall expressions FE1 and FE2 are equivalent iff
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FE1 implies FE2 and FE2 implies FE1.
Proof. Proof of the Only-If-Part: Assume that FE1 and FE2 are equivalent.
Thus, the packet set PS1 associated with FE1 and the packet set PS2 associ-
ated with FE2 are identical. Therefore, PS1 is a subset of PS2 and PS2 is a
subset of PS1. From Theorem 2, FE1 implies FE2 and FE2 implies FE1.
Proof of the If-Part: Assume that FE1 implies FE2 and FE2 implies
FE1. Thus, from Theorem 2, PS1 is a subset of PS2 and PS2 is a subset of
PS1. Therefore, the packet set PS1 associated with FE1 and the packet set
PS2 associated with FE2 are identical and the two firewall expressions FE1
and FE2 are equivalent.
Algorithm 8
Input: Two firewall expressions FE1 and FE2
Output: A determination of whether FE1 and FE2 are equivalent
Steps: Use Algorithm 7 twice to determine: (1) whether FE1 implies FE2
and (2) whether FE2 implies FE1. From Theorem 5, if FE1 implies FE2 and
FE2 implies FE1, then FE1 and FE2 are equivalent. Otherwise, also from
Theorem 5, FE1 and FE2 are not equivalent.
Time Complexity: The time complexity of Algorithm 8 is twice the time




The main contribution of this chapter is to present a generalization
of firewalls called firewall expressions. Each firewall expression is specified
using one or more firewalls and the three firewall operators “not”, “and”, and
“or”. We showed that each firewall expression can be represented by a set
of slices called a base of the firewall expression. We also showed that the
bases of given firewall expressions can be used to determine whether the given
firewall expressions satisfy some desired properties of adequacy, implication,
and equivalence. Finally, we showed that firewall expressions can be utilized
to support bottom-up methods for designing firewalls.
A concrete running example has been presented in [53] to illustrate the
utility of some of the algorithms presented in this chapter.
The authors in [38, 41] investigated a novel representation of firewalls as
finite automata rather than as sequences of rules. They show later in [40], how
to use the automata representation of a given firewall to determine whether the
given firewall satisfies some desired properties of adequacy, implication, and
equivalence. They also showed in a recent work [39] that a firewall expression
can also be represented as finite automata.
It has been shown in [18] that the problems of determining whether
given firewalls satisfy some desired properties of adequacy, implication, and
equivalence are all NP-hard. From this fact and the fact that each (complete)
firewall is also a firewall expression, it follows that the problems of determining
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whether given firewall expressions satisfy some desired properties of adequacy,
implication, and equivalence are also NP-hard. Indeed, the time complexities
of Algorithms 6, 7, and 8 that can be used to determine whether given fire-
wall expressions satisfy some desired properties of adequacy, implication, and
equivalence are all exponential.
There are two main approaches to face the NP-hardness of determining
whether given firewall expressions satisfy some desired properties of adequacy,
implication, and equivalence. The first approach is to use SAT solvers, for
example as discussed in [33], [77], and [5], to determine whether given fire-
wall expressions satisfy some desired properties of adequacy, implication, and
equivalence. Note that the time complexity of using SAT solvers is polynomial
in most practical situations.
The second approach is to use probabilistic algorithms [1]. Note that
the time complexities of probabilistic algorithms are always polynomial but
unfortunately these algorithms can yield wrong determinations in rare cases.
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Chapter 6
Outsourcing of Firewall Expressions
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5, we presented a generalization of firewalls called firewall
expressions. A firewall expression is specified using one or more firewalls and
the three firewall operators: “not”, “and”, and “or”. An example of a firewall
expression FE is as follows:
FE = (G and not(H)) or not(G)
In this example, G and H are two firewalls, called the component firewalls of
FE, “not”, “and”, and “or” are firewall operators. This firewall expression
accepts a packet p iff firewall G accepts p and firewall H rejects p or firewall G
rejects p. In the rest of this chapter, when we mention ‘firewall expression FE’,
we mean the firewall expression in the above example and when we mention
‘component firewalls of FE’, we mean firewalls G and H mentioned above.
We now introduce a generalization of firewall systems, called expression
systems, whose underlying firewall is a firewall expression. Like a firewall
system, an expression system can be used as a packet filter when placed at
the entry point of an enterprise network to examine the packets that attempt
to enter the network and decide based on an underlying firewall expression
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whether to accept or reject each of these packets. If the expression system
determines that packet p is to be rejected, then the system discards packet p.
Otherwise, the expression system determines that packet p is to be accepted
and in this case the system forwards p to the enterprise network.
When part of the tasks that need to be executed to implement and
manage an expression system are executed by public clouds, then the resulting
system is called an outsourced expression system. Our goal in this chapter is to
design an outsourced expression system such that the resulting system prevents
the attacks that can be caused by public clouds that are used to implement
the system.
6.2 Expression Systems
For firewall expression FE, we can define an Expression System as a
system that takes as input any packet p and determines whether packet p is
accepted or rejected according to the firewall expression FE. In this case, we
call FE the underlying firewall expression of the expression system.
The firewall expression FE has two component firewalls G and H.
Figure 6.1 presents the architecture of the expression system whose underlying
firewall expression is FE. This expression system has 3 components: one
firewall system for G , one firewall system for H, and one decision unit which
we call an overall decision unit.






(p, decision of p) 
for G 
(p, decision of p)
for H 
accept p or reject p
firewall system 
for H
Figure 6.1: Expression system for firewall expression FE which has two com-
ponent firewalls G and H
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each of the two component firewall systems. The architecture of each compo-





(p, #(G, p)) 
(p , decision of p)
overall decision unit
Figure 6.2: Firewall system for component firewall G
Figure 6.2 presents the architecture of the firewall system for G which
consists of two units: a rule matching unit and a decision unit. When p enters
this firewall system, p is first forwarded to the rule matching unit. Then, the
rule matching unit uses the underlying firewall G to compute the sequence
number #(G, p) of the first match rule in G for p. Next, the rule matching
unit forwards the pair (p, #(G, p)) to the decision unit. Finally, the decision
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unit takes as input packet p and the sequence number #(G, p) received from
the rule matching unit and uses firewall G to compute the decision (“accept”
or “reject”) of the rule whose sequence number is #(G, p). After computing
the decision for packet p, the decision unit sends the pair (p, decision of p) to




(p, #(H, p)) 
(p , decision of p)
overall decision unit
Figure 6.3: Firewall system for component firewall H
Figure 6.3 presents the architecture of the firewall system for H which
consists of two units: a rule matching unit and a decision unit. Similar to the
system in Figure 6.2, this system computes the decision for packet p according
to the underlying firewall H and sends the pair (p, decision of p) to the overall
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decision unit
The task of the overall decision unit is to take as input two pairs of (p,
decision of p), one from the firewall system for G and one from the firewall
system for H, and compute a decision for packet p according to the underlying
firewall expression FE. If the overall decision unit determines that the decision
for packet p is “accept”, then the decision unit forwards p to the enterprise
network. Otherwise, the overall decision unit determines that the decision for
packet p is “reject”, then the decision unit discards packet p and prevents it
from entering the network.
6.3 Outsourced Expression Systems
In this section, we design an outsourced expression system whose under-
lying firewall expression FE has two component firewalls G and H. Figure 6.4
shows the architecture of the outsourced expression system for the firewall
expression FE. (Extending the discussion to designing an outsourced expres-
sion system whose underlying firewall expression has any number of component
firewalls is straight forward.)
Our outsourced expression system is obtained from the expression sys-
tem in Figure 6.1 by replacing the firewall system for component firewall G
with a private system for G and by replacing the firewall system for component
firewall H with a private system for H. (Recall that the private system for








(p, decision of p) for G 
or halt
accept p or 
reject p or 
halt
(p, decision of p)  for H 
or halt
Figure 6.4: Outsourced expression system for firewall expression FE that has
two component firewalls G and H
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Figure 6.5 shows the private system for G that consists of two identical
rule matching units and a verifiable decision unit. The two rule matching units
are hosted in two public clouds C1 and C2. Each rule matching unit uses an
incomplete version IG of the underlying firewall G. Note that the incomplete
version of G is the same as G except that the decisions of all the rules in G




(p, v1  ) from C1 
cloud 
C1 rule matching 
cloud 
C2
(p, v2 ) from C2 
(p, decision of p) for G 
or halt
overall decision unit
accept p or 
reject p or 
halt
Figure 6.5: Private system for component firewall G
Figure 6.6 shows the private system for H that consists of two identical
rule matching units and a verifiable decision unit. The two rule matching units
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are hosted in two public clouds C3 and C4. Each rule matching unit uses an
incomplete version IH of the underlying firewall H. Note that the incomplete
version of H is the same as H except that the decisions of all the rules in H
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(p, decision of p) for H 
or halt
overall decision unit
accept p or 
reject p or 
halt
Figure 6.6: Private system for component firewall H
6.4 Execution of Outsourced Expression Systems
Assume that a packet p attempts to pass the expression system in
Figure 6.4. Then packet p is directed to both the private system for G and
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the private system for H.
When packet p enters the private system for G, p is first directed to
the rule matching unit hosted in cloud C1 so that C1 can compute a sequence
number v1 using IG and send the pair (p, v1) to the verifiable decision unit.
Also, packet p is directed to the rule matching unit hosted in cloud C2 so that
C2 can compute a sequence number v2 using IG and send the pair (p, v2) to
the verifiable decision unit.
Cloud C1 computes v1 as the sequence number #(IG, p) of the first
match rule in IG for p. Similarly, cloud C2 computes v2 as the sequence
number #(IG, p) of the first match rule in IG for p.
After the verifiable decision unit receives the two pairs (p, v1) and (p,
v2), the decision unit checks whether the two sequence numbers v1 and v2
are equal. If v1 and v2 are equal, then the decision unit uses the underlying
firewall G to determine the decision (“accept” or “reject”) of the rule whose
sequence number is v1. After computing the decision for packet p, the verifiable
decision unit sends the pair (p, decision of p) to the overall decision unit of
the expression system.
On the other hand, if the two sequence numbers v1 and v2 are not equal,
then the verifiable decision unit concludes that one of the two pairs (p, v1) and
(p, v2) is corrupted as these pairs are being transferred from the rule matching
unit to the verifiable decision unit. In this case, the verifiable decision unit
“issues a halt” to the overall decision unit.
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When the overall decision unit receives a “halt” command from the
verifiable system of the private system for G or from the verifiable system
of the private system for H, the overall decision unit puts the outsourced
expression system into a halt so that no more incoming packet can enter this
expression system. The private system for H works same as the private system
for G.
If the overall decision unit receives (p, decision of p) from the private
system for G and (p, decision of p) from the private system for H as shown
in Figure 6.7, the overall decision unit computes the decision for packet p as
follows.
overall decision unit






(p, decision of p) 
for H or
halt
Figure 6.7: The overall decision unit
Let dG denote the decision of p received by the overall decision unit
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from the private system for G, and let dH denote the decision of p received by
the overall decision unit from the private system for H.
• The overall decision unit computes a Boolean expression BE for the
pair (p, FE) as follows. If dG is “accept”, then every occurrence of G
in FE is replaced by TRUE in BE. Otherwise every occurrence of G
in FE is replaced by FALSE in BE. Similarly, if dH is “accept”, then
every occurrence of H in FE is replaced by TRUE in BE. Otherwise
every occurrence of H in FE is replaced by FALSE in BE. Moreover,
the firewall operators “not”, “and”, and “or” in FE are replaced by the
Boolean operators “¬”, “∧”, and “∨” respectively in BE.
• If BE evaluates to TRUE, then the decision for p is “accept”. Otherwise,
BE evaluates to FALSE and the decision for p is “reject”.
If the computed decision for packet p is “reject”, then the overall deci-
sion unit discards packet p. Otherwise, the decision for packet p is “accept”
and in this case the decision unit forwards packet p to the enterprise network.
6.5 Security of Outsourced Expression Systems
In Section 3.3 in Chapter 3, we argued that an outsourced system for
any underlying firewall F where the rule matching unit is hosted in a public
cloud C is vulnerable to two types of security attacks: verifiability attacks
and privacy attacks. Later in Section 3.4 and in Section 3.5 in Chapter 3, we
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showed how to modify the outsourced system for the underlying firewall F to
make sure that verifiability attacks and privacy attacks cannot occur in the
modified system. This modified system is called the private system for firewall
F .
The outsourced expression system presented in Section 6.3 in the cur-
rent chapter uses two private systems for component firewalls G and H. Each
private system uses two public clouds to outsource the two rule matching
units. For example, the private system for G outsources the two rule match-
ing units to two public clouds C1 and C2, where both clouds are sensible and
they are non-colluding. By applying Theorem 3.4.1 to the private system for
component firewall G, we conclude that verifiability attacks cannot occur in
the private system for G.
Similarly, the private system for H outsources the two rule matching
units to two public clouds C3 and C4 where both clouds are sensible and
they are non-colluding. By applying Theorem 3.4.1 to the private system for
component firewall H, we conclude that verifiability attacks cannot occur in
the private system for H.
Since no verifiability attack can occur in each private system of the
outsourced expression system, we conclude that no verifiability attack can
occur in the outsourced expression system.
By Theorem 3.5.1 the private system for the component firewall G
prevents privacy attacks from occurring because neither of the two clouds C1
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or C2 knows the underlying firewall G. (Note that neither of the two clouds
C1 and C2 knows the firewall expression FE and the underlying firewall H.)
Similarly, By Theorem 3.5.1 the private system for the component fire-
wall G prevents privacy attack from occurring neither of the two clouds C3 or
C4 knows the underlying firewall H. (Note that neither of the two clouds C3
and C4 knows the firewall expression FE and the underlying firewall G.)
Since no privacy attack can occur in each private system of the out-
sourced expression system, we conclude that no privacy attack can occur in
the outsourced expression system.
6.6 Chapter Summary
The main contribution of this chapter is two-fold.
First, we showed that it is possible to design a packet filter for an
enterprise network by choosing a generalized firewall model, namely firewall
expression, which is a combination of multiple firewalls. For this model, we
designed a generalized firewall system, called an expression system. An ex-
pression system takes as input a packet p and determines whether to accept
or reject p according to an underlying firewall expression. We discussed the
architecture of an expression system in Section 6.2.
Second, we designed an outsourced expression system using public
clouds (presented in Section 6.3). We described the execution of our designed
outsourced expression system in Section 6.4. In this system, a private system
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is used for each component firewall of the underlying firewall expression. We
discussed in Section 6.5 that verifiability and privacy attack cannot occur in
our outsourced expression system.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation, we identified a class of outsourced systems whose
rule matching units are executed in public clouds. Since public clouds are
usually unreliable, we further identified that the outsourced systems obtained
by executing the rule matching units in public clouds are vulnerable to two
types of security attacks: verifiability attacks and privacy attacks.
Prior outsourced systems that exist in literature either defend against
verifiability attacks or defend against privacy attacks. But none of these sys-
tem defends against both types of attacks. Our main contribution in this
dissertation is to design several outsourced systems whose rule matching units
are executed in public clouds such that the resulting systems prevent verifia-
bility and privacy attacks from occurring.
Every outsourced system is built on top of an underlying firewall. We
present the formal definition and example of an underlying firewall in Chap-
ter 2. We have identified a special class of firewalls, called partially specified
firewalls in Chapter 4. We have also identified a generalization of firewalls,
called firewall expressions in Chapter 5. For each of these classes, we designed
outsourced system that prevents both verifiability and privacy attacks from
90
occurring.
In Chapter 3, we first presented the architecture of an outsourced sys-
tem for firewalls which has one rule matching unit and one decision unit, where
the rule matching unit is executed in a public cloud. Then, we formally speci-
fied verifiability and privacy attacks that can occur in this outsourced system.
Next, we modified this outsourced system to a system, called the private sys-
tem. The design of the private system involved two identical rule matching
units which are executed in two public clouds. The private system prevents
both verifiability and privacy attacks under the assumption that the two public
clouds used in this system are sensible and non-colluding.
We introduced partially specified firewalls in Chapter 4. In a partially
specified firewall the decisions of some of the rules in the firewall are not
specified. To design an outsourced system for partially specified firewall we
used the private system designed in Chapter 3 for firewalls. In Chapter 4, we
showed that every partially specified firewall has an equivalent (fully specified)
firewall. Thus, we achieved an outsourced system for any partially specified
firewall PF by first obtaining an equivalent firewall F from PF , and then
designing a private system for firewall F .
In Chapter 5, we presented a generalization of firewalls called firewall
expressions which is specified using one or more component firewalls and three
firewall operators: “not”, “and”, and “or”. For any underlying firewall ex-
pression FE, we defined an Expression System as a special class of firewall
systems that takes as input any packet p and determines whether the under-
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lying firewall expression FE accepts or rejects packet p.
We designed an outsourced expression system for any underlying fire-
wall expression FE in Chapter 6. We achieved this outsourced expression
system by using a private system, presented in Chapter 3, for each component
firewall of FE and combining these private systems through an overall decision
unit to determine whether any packet is accepted or rejected according to the
underlying firewall expression FE.
Although we have made a number of contributions to design of out-
sourced systems, several avenues of future work still remain. Below we discuss
some of the avenues for future work:
• The private system presented in Chapter 3 involves two public clouds
system and this system can prevent both verifiability and privacy attacks
under the assumption that the two public clouds are sensible and are non-
colluding. An interesting open problem is to design a private system that
can prevent both verifiability and privacy attacks when the two public
clouds are sensible and can be colluding.
A high-level idea of how to proceed to solve this problem is discussed
below. One can proceed by designing two firewalls F1 and F2 from the
underlying firewall F such that F1 and F2 are ‘different’ but they are
functionally equivalent to F . One might use the concept of partially
specified firewalls discussed in Chapter 4 to create two different but func-
tionally equivalent firewalls from an underlying firewall.
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Firewalls F1 and F2 are different in a way such that for any incoming
packet p, the sequence number #(F1, p) may not be same as the sequence
number #(F2, p). Moreover, the first match rule in F in p can be either
the first match rule or the second match rule in F1 for p. Similarly, the
first match rule in F in p can be either the first match rule or the second
match rule in F2 for p. The mapping between F and F1 and the mapping
between F and F2 should be pre-calculated and stored at the enterprise
side. It will also be required that if the first match rule in F in p is
mapped to the second match rule in firewall Fi for packet p, then the
first match rule in Fi for p is not mapped to any rule in F .
After obtaining two different firewalls from F , one can then modify the
private system presented in Chapter 3 as follows. One rule matching unit
can be executed in a public cloud C1 based on firewall F1 and another
rule matching unit can be executed in a public cloud C2 based on firewall
F2. The two public clouds C1 and C2 are sensible but can be colluding.
Each cloud Ci will be required to send the sequence numbers of both
the first and second match rules for any incoming packet p based on the
underlying firewall Fi. The decision unit will then use the pre-calculated
mappings between F and F1 and between F and F2 to determine that
each mapping resolves to the same rule in F , which is the first match
rule in F for p. The high-level solution presented above merits further
research.
• The firewall model considered in this dissertation is stateless. A firewall
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F is called stateless when a packet is accepted or rejected by F only
based on the rules in F . A model for designing stateful firewalls has been
presented in [27]. In this model, each stateful firewall has a variable set
called the state of the firewall, which is used to store some packets that
the firewall has accepted previously and needs to remember in the near
future. A packet is accepted or rejected by a stateful firewall F not only
based on the rules in F but also based on the state of firewall F i.e, the
packets that have been previously accepted by F .
One open problem is to extend the techniques presented in this disser-
tation to design outsourced systems for stateful firewalls such that the
resulting systems can prevent both verifiability and privacy attacks from
occurring.
The authors in [37] suggest that their outsourced firewall system that
is designed for stateless firewall can be extended for stateful firewall by
storing the state of the firewall in the clear in the cloud. However, their
designed system defends only against privacy attacks. No outsourced sys-
tem has been proposed yet for stateful firewalls that can defend against
both verifiability and privacy attacks. To use the techniques presented
in this dissertation to design outsourced systems for stateful firewalls,
one must first find the answer of the following question. Where to store
the state of the firewall such that the verifiability and privacy attacks
are prevented and also purpose of outsourcing is achieved?
• In this dissertation, we developed methods to prevent both verifiability
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and privacy attacks for firewall outsourcing. The problems of extending
these techniques for outsourcing other middleboxes (such as Intrusion
Detection System (IDS [52]), Network Address Translation (NAT [65]))
that defend against both verifiability and privacy attacks require further
research.
Several middlebox outsourcing techniques, for example [43, 62], and [75]
have already been presented in the literature. However, none of these
techniques defends against both verifiability and privacy attacks.
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